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ABSTRACT 
  Although section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires 
that employers reasonably accommodate their employees’ religious 
practices and beliefs, many commentators acknowledge that the spirit 
of reasonable accommodation has not been realized because courts 
have drastically limited the scope of employers’ duty. This may be 
especially true for Muslims, who, according to a 2012 study, are 
roughly half as likely to prevail in free-exercise and religious-
accommodation lawsuits as are non-Muslim claimants. One of the 
central tenets of Islam, the hajj, poses significant challenges for 
Muslim employees seeking accommodation under Title VII. Because 
accommodating the hajj will almost always impose more than a de 
minimis cost on employers, a court is unlikely to find that Title VII 
requires employers to accommodate a Muslim employee’s decision to 
complete the pilgrimage. 
  This Note attempts to articulate a new method for expanding Title 
VII’s protection of employees’ religious beliefs and practices. 
Specifically, this Note argues that increased involvement by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and the Department of Justice 
in hajj-accommodation cases offers a promising approach to 
developing a more balanced accommodation doctrine, or at least to 
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realigning the scales so that they are not tilted so heavily in favor of 
employers. Despite clear precedent limiting an employer’s duty to 
accommodate, increased intervention by the federal government in 
Title VII hajj-accommodation cases has the potential to shift the 
conception of reasonable accommodation. Though the government 
must pick and choose the cases in which to intervene, hajj-
accommodation cases present an opportunity to further the dual 
purposes of the government’s Title VII enforcement authority to 
implement the public interest as well as to bring about more effective 
enforcement of private rights. Intervention can restore the spirit of 
accommodation to section 701(j) and give employers more of an 
incentive to accommodate their employees’ religious obligations. 
INTRODUCTION 
In August 2008, a Muslim schoolteacher named Safoorah Khan 
approached her supervisor to request three weeks of unpaid leave so 
that she could travel to Mecca, Saudi Arabia.1 This was not simply a 
request for a vacation. Khan needed time off to complete the hajj, an 
obligatory pilgrimage that all Muslims are expected to complete once 
in their lifetime.2 The superintendent of her Berkeley, Illinois, school 
district denied the request, explaining that the school could not afford 
to lose its only math-lab instructor so close to state testing.3 In 
response, Khan submitted a letter of resignation but continued to 
teach until her scheduled departure for Mecca in December.4 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) found something troubling 
about Khan’s story. In the eyes of the DOJ Civil Rights Division, the 
school district’s denial of Khan’s request for unpaid leave “compelled 
Ms. Khan to choose between her job and her religious beliefs, and 
thus forced her discharge.”5 After Khan filed an employment-
discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), the DOJ filed a lawsuit against the Berkeley 
school district “to enforce the provisions of Title VII of the Civil 
 
 1. Jerry Markon, Justice Dept. Backs Muslim Teacher, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2011, at A1. 
 2. Id.; see also infra notes 40–45 and accompanying text. 
 3. Markon, supra note 1. Khan had informed her school’s principal in the spring of 2008 of 
her intention to complete the hajj in December of that year. She was told that “[a]ll she had to 
do was submit her paperwork” to receive time off. Manya A. Brachear, Muslim’s Long 
Pilgrimage Struggle, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 2011, at 1. 
 4. Brachear, supra note 3. 
 5. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files Religious Discrimination 
Lawsuit Against Berkeley School District in Illinois (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/December/10-crt-1432.html. 
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Rights Act of 1964.”6 Though the DOJ trumpeted the lawsuit as a 
part of its “ongoing commitment to actively enforce federal 
employment discrimination laws,”7 others were not convinced. A 
former DOJ civil-rights official from the Bush administration called it 
“a political lawsuit to placate Muslims.”8 Senator Lindsey Graham 
described the “curious decision” to file suit as having gone “too far.”9 
Whatever the motivation for bringing the lawsuit, the 
observation of former Attorney General Michael Mukasey was 
perhaps the most damning. In a Washington Post article, Mukasey 
opined that bringing the lawsuit was “a very dubious judgment and a 
real legal reach.”10 This characterization may very well have been 
accurate, but because the DOJ threw the weight of the federal 
government against a small town of around five thousand people, 
United States v. Board of Education11 (the Berkeley case) ultimately 
settled without resolving the issue of whether Title VII required 
accommodation.12 
Section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employers 
to reasonably accommodate their employees’ religious practices and 
beliefs unless such accommodation would impose an undue hardship 
on employers.13 But, as many commentators acknowledge, “the spirit 
of reasonable accommodation has not been realized”14 because courts 
 
 6. Complaint at 1, United States v. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:10-cv-07900 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 
2010); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 7. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 5. 
 8. Markon, supra note 1 (quoting Hans von Spakovsky) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
 9. Protecting the Civil Rights of American Muslims: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, Human Rights, & the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary 15–17 
(2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2011/03/29/
National-Politics/Graphics/durbin_islam_transcript.pdf (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham). 
 10. Markon, supra note 1 (quoting Mukasey) (internal quotation mark omitted). It should 
be noted that during the Bush administration, the EEOC filed a similar Title VII suit involving 
a Muslim employee’s request for accommodation to complete the hajj. Consent Decree at 1, 
EEOC v. S. Hills Med. Ctr., No. 3:07-cv-00976 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2009). As in the Berkeley 
case, the employer denied the allegation but ultimately settled. Id. 
 11. United States v. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:10-cv-07900 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2010). 
 12. Consent Decree at 2–3, Bd. of Educ., No. 1:10-cv-7900. The parties waived any findings 
of fact and conclusions of law on all issues. Id. at 3. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006). 
 14. Thomas D. Brierton, “Reasonable Accommodation” Under Title VII: Is It Reasonable 
to the Religious Employee?, 42 CATH. LAW. 165, 167 (2002); see also Karen Engle, The 
Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision To Redeem 
Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 431 (1997) (“The religious accommodation advocates know all 
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have defined undue hardship at a threshold of “more than a de 
minimis cost.”15 Rather than ensuring that employees are not forced 
to choose between their jobs and their religion, courts’ interpretation 
of section 701(j) has instead allowed employers to deny employees 
relief.16 This may be especially true for Muslims: according to a 2012 
study, non-Muslims are twice as likely as Muslims to prevail in free-
exercise and religious-accommodation lawsuits.17 And because 
accommodating the hajj will almost always impose more than a de 
minimis cost on employers, a court is unlikely to find that Title VII 
requires employers to accommodate a Muslim employee’s decision to 
complete the pilgrimage. Although a federal judge has never issued 
an opinion in a Title VII case in which a Muslim employee sought 
accommodation to complete the hajj,18 there is reason to believe that 
a plaintiff in such a case would lose on the merits.19 
That a Muslim employee would likely lose a hajj-accommodation 
case is particularly unsettling because the hajj is a central tenet of 
Islam. And although this Note does not advocate that the centrality of 
a belief is—or should be—relevant to the Title VII analysis,20 it does 
seem that a law requiring employers to accommodate religious 
 
too well that the doctrine has not ‘worked’ for them.”); Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure 
To Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection of Religious Employees: Proposals for an 
Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 585 (2000) (“The Supreme Court has thereby 
interpreted § 701(j) in a manner that is clearly at odds with its purpose.”); Pamela S. Karlan & 
George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 
1, 6 (1996) (“[Title VII’s] seemingly broad definition of religion received a surprisingly narrow 
interpretation . . . .”). 
 15. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). 
 16. Engle, supra note 14, at 388. 
 17. Non-Muslim claimants succeed in presenting a free-exercise or religious-
accommodation claim in 38 percent of cases, compared to 22 percent for Muslims. Gregory C. 
Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence 
from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231, 251 (2012). The difference in likelihood of 
success between Muslims and non-Muslims in Title VII cases may be under- or overstated 
because the dataset used in this article is not limited to Title VII cases. See id. at 236 (explaining 
that several types of cases were used in the study). 
 18. A WestlawNext search with the query “hajj & accommodat!” run on January 4, 2013, 
returned thirty-eight cases, none of which involved a Title VII claim for accommodation. A 
search with the query “hajj & Title VII” returned fifteen cases, none of which involved a 
religious-accommodation claim under section 701(j). 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. Granting enhanced protection for central tenets of a faith would almost certainly be 
unconstitutional. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“[I]t is not within the 
judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker 
more correctly perceived the commands of their . . . faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural 
interpretation.”). 
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practices should protect the central tenets of a religion. Commentary 
on Title VII’s failure to protect religious minorities is not new;21 to 
address this failure, many commentators suggest that the solution 
should come through legislative amendment to Title VII22 or through 
Supreme Court action.23 Yet Congress has considered legislation 
aimed at undoing the Court’s interpretation of section 701(j) in every 
legislative session since 1994 without a single bill making it out of 
committee.24 Similarly, the Court has not overturned its own 
precedent regarding the duty to accommodate religious observance. 
Therefore, if the spirit of reasonable accommodation is to be 
restored, it will have to be done another way. 
This Note attempts to articulate a new method for expanding 
Title VII’s protection of religious beliefs and practices and for 
balancing the sometimes-conflicting interests of employers and 
employees. Specifically, this Note argues that increased involvement 
in hajj-accommodation cases by the EEOC and the DOJ is a 
promising mechanism for developing a more balanced 
accommodation doctrine, one that realigns the scales so that they are 
not tilted as heavily in favor of employers. Despite precedent limiting 
employers’ duty to accommodate, increased intervention by the 
EEOC and the DOJ in Title VII hajj-accommodation cases has the 
potential to shift the conception of what constitutes reasonable 
accommodation.25 Moreover, by restoring the spirit of section 701(j) 
such that Title VII has some bite, employers will have more of an 
incentive to accommodate their employees’ religious obligations in 
the first instance and thus avert a potential lawsuit. Though the 
government must pick and choose the cases in which to intervene, 
hajj-accommodation cases present the opportunity to further the dual 
 
 21. See generally Brierton, supra note 14 (arguing that Title VII does not provide adequate 
accommodations for religious employees); Kaminer, supra note 14 (same); Sonny Franklin 
Miller, Note, Religious Accommodation Under Title VII: The Burdenless Burden, 22 J. CORP. L. 
789 (1997) (same). 
 22. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 14, at 629 (“This article proposes that § 701(j) be 
amended . . . .”). 
 23. See, e.g., Bilal Zaheer, Note, Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How 
Muslims Make the Case for a New Interpretation of Section 701(j), 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 522 
(“[C]ourts should require employers to accommodate all religious practices deemed ‘central’ to 
the employee’s faith, unless accommodation of those practices would result in an undue (i.e., 
significant) hardship to the employer.”). 
 24. See infra notes 219–223 and accompanying text. 
 25. This Note uses intervention and involvement interchangeably to mean government 
participation in Title VII litigation between an employer and an individual employee. 
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purposes of its Title VII enforcement power “to implement the public 
interest” and “to bring about more effective enforcement of private 
rights.”26 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief 
description of Islam and the hajj to give context to the rest of the 
analysis. Parts II and III assess the likelihood that a Muslim employee 
who wishes to complete the hajj would succeed on the merits of a 
Title VII claim alleging failure to reasonably accommodate. Part II.A 
discusses the history of section 701(j) and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the duty to accommodate an employee’s religious 
practice. Part II.B describes various ways that an employer can avoid 
providing accommodation for an employee under current Title VII 
jurisprudence. Part III applies the analysis of the previous Part to 
explain why Muslims will almost never be able to mount a successful 
claim of religious discrimination based on an employer’s failure to 
accommodate the hajj. Finally, Part IV argues that the federal 
government’s intervention in hajj-accommodation cases will lead to 
increased protection and accommodation for Muslims as well as for 
religious employees generally by creating a more robust and balanced 
Title VII framework of reasonable accommodation. 
I.  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM AND ITS PRACTICES 
There are 2.6 million Muslims living in the United States as of 
2010, and that number is projected to increase to 6.3 million by 2030.27 
This increase will be fueled in part by a rise in Muslim immigration, 
which has increased steadily since the 1990s,28 but there will also be a 
noticeable change as the population of native-born Muslims grows.29 
Despite America’s burgeoning and increasingly native-born Muslim 
population, Islam remains largely misunderstood,30 perhaps in part 
because of media reports that tend to “misrepresent not only the 
details of the Islamic system . . . but also the fundamental concepts 
 
 26. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980). 
 27. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, THE FUTURE OF THE 
GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION: PROJECTIONS FOR 2010–2030, at 15 (2011). 
 28. Id. at 147. 
 29. Id. at 152. 
 30. Nearly 60 percent of Americans admit to having little to no knowledge of Islamic 
practices. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, BENEDICT XVI VIEWED 
FAVORABLY BUT FAULTED ON RELIGIOUS OUTREACH: PUBLIC EXPRESSES MIXED VIEWS OF 
ISLAM, MORMONISM 1 (2007). 
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and teachings of the religion.”31 To contextualize the forthcoming 
discussion, this Part provides background on Islam’s major tenets, 
with a particular emphasis on the hajj. 
Although 70 percent of Americans believe that Islam is “very 
different” from their own religion,32 the truth is that Islam shares 
substantial similarities with other major Western faiths.33 Like 
Christianity and Judaism, Islam is rooted in the Abrahamic 
tradition.34 The Qur’an35 references Christianity and Judaism and 
endorses many of the teachings of those faiths.36 
Central to Islamic faith are various obligatory acts of worship, 
called ibadat, which are often referred to as the “Five Pillars of 
Islam.”37 The ibadat consists of (1) the declaration of faith, shahadah; 
(2) the five prescribed daily prayers, salah; (3) fasting during the 
Islamic month of Ramadan, sawm; (4) giving a portion of one’s 
disposable income to those in need, zakah; and (5) the pilgrimage to 
Mecca, hajj.38 Each act is prescribed by the Qur’an, and is obligatory 
for all Muslims, regardless of where they may live.39 
The obligation to complete the hajj is found directly in Al-
’Imran, the third sura of the Qur’an: 
 
 31. SUZANNE HANEEF, WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT ISLAM AND MUSLIMS, 
at ix (14th ed. 1996). In fact, a 2007 poll found that “[t]he biggest influence on the public’s 
impressions of Muslims, particularly among those who express an unfavorable opinion of 
Muslims, is what people hear and read in the media.” PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & 
THE PRESS, supra note 30, at 4–5. 
 32. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, supra note 30, at 1. 
 33. HANEEF, supra note 31, at 195; see also JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT 
PATH, at xii (4th ed. 2011) (“Media images of Islam have often obscured the fact that Muslims, 
Jews, and Christians share much in common . . . .”). 
 34. See HANEEF, supra note 31, at 196 (“Abraham symbolizes the unity of this belief [in 
the Oneness of God] from which issued forth Judaism, Christianity and Islam.”). 
 35. The Qur’an is the holy scripture of the Islamic faith, which Muslims believe was 
revealed to the Prophet Mohammed between 610 and 632 AD. Id. at 20. 
 36. See, e.g., THE QUR’AN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 5:69 (Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali trans., Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an 2008) (“Those who believe (in the Qur-án), those who 
follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Sabians and the Christians,—any who believe in God and 
the Last Day, and work righteousness—on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.” 
(footnote omitted)). Of course, there are fundamental differences between the faiths as well. 
For example, Muslims and Jews do not believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ, though Muslims 
do recognize that Jesus was a “prophet in the line of the other prophets raised among the 
Children of Israel.” HANEEF, supra note 31, at 202. 
 37. HANEEF, supra note 31, at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38. For a description of the details of each of these practices, see generally id. at 51–70. 
 39. Id. at 50. 
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  The first house (of worship) appointed for men was that at 
Bakka: full of blessing and of guidance for all kinds of beings. 
  In it are signs manifest; (for example), the Station of Abraham; 
whoever enters it attains security; pilgrimage thereto is a duty men 
owe to God,—those who can afford the journey . . . .40 
The Qur’an imposes this duty upon all Muslims, but because the 
cost of completing the hajj is substantial,41 an exception is made for 
those who are unable to afford it.42 Those who are physically unable 
to participate in the hajj are similarly exempted from the obligation.43 
Each year, more than two million Muslims travel to Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia, to perform the hajj.44 The pilgrimage occurs each year from 
the eighth through the thirteenth day of Dhu Al-Hijjah, the twelfth 
month of the Islamic calendar.45 Dressed in white cloth, called ihram, 
Muslims participating in the hajj spend specified moments in Mecca 
and certain locations nearby performing obligatory rites.46 The central 
ritual of the hajj is the circumambulation of the Ka’bah, the House of 
God.47 A black stone located in the eastern corner of the Ka’bah is 
said to have been delivered by an angel to Abraham as he built the 
 
 40. THE QUR’AN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY, supra note 36, 3:96–97 
(footnotes omitted). 
 41. There are travel agencies dedicated to providing a range of services for Muslims to 
complete the hajj. See, e.g., DAR EL SALAM, http://www.darelsalam.com (last visited Jan. 16, 
2012) (offering hajj travel packages that can cost up to $16,900). 
 42. THE QUR’AN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY, supra note 36, 3:97; see also 
Hajj, ROYAL EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA, http://www.saudiembassy.net/issues/hajj (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2012) (“The emphasis on financial ability is meant to ensure that a Muslim takes care of 
his family first.”). 
 43. THE QUR’AN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY, supra note 36, 2:196. One 
could argue that Islam itself provides reasonable accommodation by exempting Muslims from 
the obligation to complete the hajj in certain situations. But if an employee claims to have a 
sincerely held religious belief that they must complete the hajj, it is not a court’s place to 
question the validity of that belief. See Engle, supra note 14, at 386 (“[T]he Guidelines[, 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1605 (1996),] on religious accommodation allow for self-definition regarding both 
belief and observance. That one is required to be sincere in that definition is the only 
limitation.”). 
 44. David Clingingsmith, Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Michael Kremer, Estimating the Impact of 
the Hajj: Religion and Tolerance in Islam’s Global Gathering, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1133, 1134 (2009). 
 45. Hajj, supra note 42. Because the Islamic calendar is based on the lunar calendar, the 
hajj begins ten or eleven days earlier in the Gregorian calendar than it did the year before. 
JUAN E. CAMPO, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 124 (J. Gordon Melton & Juan E. Campo eds., 
2009). 
 46. REEM AL FAISAL & SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, HAJJ 87 (2009). 
 47. Id. 
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Ka’bah on top of the base of the original temple built by Adam.48 The 
Black Stone “is the holiest object in the Holy Sanctuary and every 
pilgrim seeks to touch and kiss it.”49 The practice has continued for 
more than 1,400 years, with Muslims traveling from all parts of the 
globe to perform the sacred and obligatory rite.50 After participating 
in the hajj, some Muslims choose to add the honorific title Hajji 
before their name to signify their completion of the pilgrimage.51 
Many describe the hajj as “the most significant religious event in their 
lives.”52 
In countries where Islam is the majority religion, such as 
Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, Islamic obligations are relatively easy to 
accommodate. For instance, Friday is a holiday rather than Sunday in 
order to facilitate the weekly congregational worship salah al-
jummah, which occurs on Friday afternoon.53 Because Islam is a 
minority religion in the United States, however, such 
accommodations are not readily available as a matter of course. 
Therefore, Muslims who wish to practice the central tenets of their 
faith must ask their employers for special accommodations, and those 
requests are often refused.54 These refusals may be attributable to a 
lack of knowledge about the practices of Islam,55 the fact that 
accommodating Muslims can be “more difficult and costly than 
accommodating other religions,”56 or, more likely, it could be some 
combination of the two. 
Muslim employees will face a particularly difficult challenge 
when they seek accommodation to complete the hajj. The hajj 
requires an extended absence from work and can only be performed 
 
 48. Id. at 88. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at xiii. 
 51. ESPOSITO, supra note 33, at 113. 
 52. Clingingsmith et al., supra note 44, at 1139. For a more thorough account of events that 
occur during the hajj, see generally AL FAISAL & NASR, supra note 46, at 87–89. 
 53. HANEEF, supra note 31, at 143. 
 54. Not only do employers often refuse to accommodate, but their decisions are often 
upheld in court. See, e.g., Khan v. Fed. Reserve Bank, No. 02 Civ.8893(JCF), 2005 WL 273027, 
at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2005) (granting summary judgment in favor of an employer who 
refused to accommodate a Muslim employee’s request to alter her work schedule during the 
month of Ramadan so that she could work through lunch); Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., No. 
98-CV-4061 (JG), 2001 WL 1152815, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001), aff’d, 318 F.3d 130 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (granting summary judgment in favor of an employer who refused to accommodate a 
Muslim employee’s request for accommodation so that he could attend salah al-jumah). 
 55. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 56. Zaheer, supra note 23, at 504. 
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at one specific time each year. Thus employers will have fewer 
options for accommodating their employees. If an employer refuses 
to accommodate, the Muslim employee must wait an entire year to 
perform the hajj, and it is not guaranteed that circumstances would 
change such that the employer will be more accommodating the next 
year. Given the profound importance of the pilgrimage, American 
Muslims are likely to have a strong interest in participating in the hajj 
at the specific time that they decide is right for them. The question is 
how much control an employer should have over a Muslim 
employee’s decision to complete the pilgrimage in a given year. The 
next Part analyzes employers’ duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation when a religious practice conflicts with an 
employment obligation. 
II.  RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION UNDER TITLE VII 
Although Title VII guarantees reasonable accommodation of 
religious beliefs and observances, judicial decisions have narrowed 
the scope of that guarantee, leaving employees of all faiths with a 
largely empty promise. To understand why a Muslim who wishes to 
complete the hajj is nearly certain to lose in a Title VII religious-
accommodation case, one must first appreciate the history of section 
701(j) and how courts’ interpretations of that section have affected 
the scope of an employer’s duty to accommodate. 
A. The Tension Within Title VII: Congress’s Intent and the Supreme 
Court’s Interpretation of the Duty To Accommodate 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an 
employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”57 Notably, however, the original act did not define the term 
“religion.”58 The act also failed to clarify whether Title VII included 
an affirmative duty to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs 
 
 57. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also established the EEOC, which 
was charged with effectuating the “purposes and policies” of Title VII. Id. § 705, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-4. 
 58. See id. § 701 (failing to define the term “religion”). 
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and practices.59 In 1972, however, Congress specifically amended Title 
VII to impose a duty to accommodate, but it did so “rather 
awkwardly” by incorporating the duty into a definition of religion.60 
Specifically, Congress defined “religion” to include “all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an 
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate 
an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or 
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s 
business.”61 
Though the floor debate on the proposed amendment was 
short,62 section 701(j)’s primary purpose was to ensure that employers 
would accommodate employees who strictly observe the Sabbath on 
days other than Sunday.63 Senator Jennings Randolph, the 
amendment’s sponsor and a practicing Seventh Day Baptist, 
expressed a concern that “there are certain faiths that are having a 
very difficult time” convincing employers to “adjust work schedules 
to fit the requirements of the faith of some of their workers.”64 
Although Sabbatarians were the intended beneficiaries of the 
amendment, Senator Randolph suggested in a colloquy with Senator 
Hoyt Dominick that the provision would also extend to “other 
religious sect[s] which [have] a different method of conducting their 
lives than do most Americans.”65 
 
 59. See Brierton, supra note 14, at 167 n.14 (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “did 
not specifically mandate ‘reasonable accommodation’”). Although the EEOC promulgated 
guidelines that imposed such a duty, “most courts chose not to follow the EEOC Guidelines” 
and instead “determin[ed] that failure to accommodate . . . should not be equated with religious 
discrimination.” Kaminer, supra note 14, at 582. 
 60. Kaminer, supra note 14, at 580. 
 61. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 2, § 701(j), 86 
Stat. 103, 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). 
 62. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 n.9 (1977) (“The legislative 
history of the measure consists chiefly of a brief floor debate in the Senate, contained in less 
than two pages of the Congressional Record and consisting principally of the views of the 
proponent of the measure, Senator Jennings Randolph.”). 
 63. See 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph) (“[T]here has 
been a partial refusal at times on the part of employers to hire or to continue in employment 
employees whose religious practices rigidly require them to abstain from work . . . on particular 
days.”); see also Hardison, 432 U.S. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The primary purpose of the 
amendment . . . was to protect Saturday Sabbatarians . . . .”). 
 64. 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph). 
 65. Id. at 706 (statement of Sen. Hoyt Dominick). Neither Senator Randolph nor Senator 
Dominick explicated which faiths they were referring to during this floor debate, but it is 
doubtful that they had Muslims and the hajj in mind. Nevertheless, “statutory prohibitions often 
go beyond the principal evil” that the statute was designed to remedy—in this case employers’ 
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Of course, section 701(j) was not designed to anticipate and 
resolve every conflict between employment duties and religious 
practices. But the amendment reflected a belief that “insofar as 
possible, the law flowing from the original Constitution of the United 
States should protect . . . religious freedom, and hopefully [one’s] 
opportunity to earn a livelihood within the American system, which 
has become . . . more pluralistic and more industrialized through the 
years.”66 Senator Randolph assumed that the language of section 
701(j) was sufficient to protect most religious observances and that 
only “a very, very small percentage of cases” would actually present 
an undue hardship sufficient to justify nonaccommodation.67 There 
would be “gray areas,” but Senator Randolph argued that these 
uncertainties “should not deter the Senate in its action” to approve 
the amendment.68 
These gray areas became very important, however, when the 
Supreme Court was confronted with the task of interpreting the scope 
of section 701(j) in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.69 In the 
Court’s view, it was clear that employers had a statutory obligation to 
provide reasonable accommodations for religious employees, but the 
reach of that obligation had not been clearly spelled out by Congress 
or by the EEOC.70 Thus, the Court was left to fill in the gaps, which it 
did by severely limiting employers’ duty to accommodate their 
employees. 
In Hardison, an employee who was a member of the Worldwide 
Church of God requested Saturdays off from work to observe the 
Sabbath.71 Like Seventh Day Baptists, one of the tenets of the 
Worldwide Church of God is that its members must refrain from 
performing any work from sunset on Friday until sunset on 
 
unwillingness to provide time off for Sabbatarians—to cover other “reasonably comparable 
evils.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 66. 118 CONG. REC. 706 (1972) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph). Some 
commentators have argued that Senator Randolph’s “desire to give private employees the same 
protection granted under the Constitution to public employees . . . might seem a little odd” 
because “even at the time of his amendment, free exercise accommodation claims were not 
faring well in courts.” Engle, supra note 14, at 371; see also id. at 362 n.174 (discussing pre-1972 
cases in which courts were reluctant to hold that the Free Exercise Clause requires employers to 
accommodate their employees). 
 67. 118 CONG. REC. 706 (1972) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
 70. Id. at 75. 
 71. Id. at 67–68. 
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Saturday.72 Trans World Airlines (TWA), the employer, agreed to 
permit the union to seek a change of work assignment for Hardison, 
but the union was unwilling to do so.73 To further accommodate 
Hardison, TWA would have been forced to (1) leave Hardison’s 
position unfilled, which would have impaired critical airline 
operations, (2) fill his position with another employee, which would 
have undermanned another position, or (3) employ someone not 
regularly assigned to work on Saturdays, which would have required 
TWA to pay premium wages.74 TWA refused to make any of these 
accommodations.75 When Hardison did not report for work on 
Saturdays, he was discharged for insubordination.76 
Hardison filed suit against TWA, claiming that his discharge 
constituted religious discrimination in violation of Title VII.77 The 
district court ruled in favor of TWA, finding that the airline had made 
reasonable accommodations and that any additional accommodation 
would have imposed an undue hardship on the company.78 The Sixth 
Circuit reversed, holding that TWA breached its duty to provide 
reasonable accommodation to Hardison’s religious needs and 
therefore was liable for religious discrimination.79 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit “in all 
relevant respects.”80 The Court was “convinced . . . that TWA itself 
[could not] be faulted for having failed to work out a shift or job swap 
for Hardison” because any unilateral swap would have violated the 
terms of the collective-bargaining agreement.81 Furthermore, the 
proposed alternative accommodations “would involve costs to TWA, 
 
 72. Id. at 67. 
 73. Id. at 68. As part of the collective-bargaining agreement with TWA, the union allocated 
shifts based on seniority. Id. The union would not violate the seniority provisions of the 
agreement, and Hardison had insufficient seniority to switch shifts. Id. 
 74. Id. at 68–69. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 69. Hardison also filed suit against the union, but the district court ruled that the 
union was not obligated to ignore its seniority system. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
judgment regarding the union because Hardison did not appear to raise the issue on appeal. Id. 
at 70. 
 78. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877, 891 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev’d, 
527 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
 79. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 44 (6th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 432 U.S. 
63 (1977). 
 80. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 77. 
 81. Id. at 78–79. 
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either in the form of lost efficiency in other jobs or higher wages.”82 
This cost, the Court determined, was too much to ask of an employer: 
“To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to 
give Hardison Saturdays off [was] an undue hardship.”83 Thus, TWA 
was not obligated to accommodate Hardison’s religious observance.84 
In a blistering dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the Court’s 
definition of undue hardship was strained, stating that “[a]s a matter 
of law, I seriously question whether simple English usage permits 
‘undue hardship’ to be interpreted to mean ‘more than de minimis 
cost.’”85 He further observed that, even under the majority’s 
definition, “[t]o conclude that TWA, one of the largest air carriers in 
the Nation, would have suffered undue hardship . . . defies both 
reason and common sense.”86 Justice Marshall concluded with a 
mournful assessment of the implications of the majority’s holding on 
the future of Title VII: 
What makes today’s decision most tragic, however, is not that 
respondent Hardison has been needlessly deprived of his livelihood 
simply because he chose to follow the dictates of his conscience. Nor 
is the tragedy exhausted by the impact it will have on thousands of 
Americans like Hardison who could be forced to live on welfare as 
the price they must pay for worshiping their God. The ultimate 
tragedy is that, despite Congress’ best efforts, one of this Nation’s 
pillars of strength—our hospitality to religious diversity—has been 
seriously eroded. All Americans will be a little poorer until today’s 
decision is erased.87 
Many commentators have sympathized with Justice Marshall’s 
dissent, arguing that the Court’s interpretation of “undue hardship” 
in Hardison is contrary to both the plain meaning of the term88 and 
the spirit of section 701(j).89 The fact remains, however, that the Court 
 
 82. Id. at 84. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 84–85. 
 85. Id. at 93 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 84 (majority opinion)). 
 86. Id. at 91; see also id. at 92 n.6 (noting that TWA would have been forced to pay “$150 
for three months, at which time [Hardison] would have been eligible to transfer”). 
 87. Id. at 96–97 (footnote omitted). 
 88. See, e.g., Zaheer, supra note 23, at 515 (“[I]t appears that only for religious 
accommodations has the Court interpreted ‘undue hardship’ in a manner at odds with its 
ordinary meaning . . . .”). 
 89. See, e.g., Engle, supra note 14, at 388 (“Far from preventing employees from having to 
choose between their religion and their jobs, as Senator Randolph had hoped, the latter part of 
section 701(j) has been used over and over to deny plaintiffs relief.”). 
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has not seen the need to reevaluate Hardison’s interpretation of 
undue hardship, nor has Congress legislatively overridden the Court’s 
holding. Thus, Hardison remains the law. 
B. The Empty Promise of Section 701(j): Avoiding Accommodation 
After Hardison 
The Court’s decision in Hardison “tipped the balance in favor of 
the employer in determining what is a reasonable accommodation,”90 
thus making it exceedingly difficult for religious employees to prevail 
in Title VII claims. But the limitations on an employer’s duty to 
accommodate did not end with Hardison. Subsequent cases decided 
by the Supreme Court and lower courts have further narrowed the 
scope of section 701(j), which has ultimately led to less 
accommodation of religious practice and observance. This Section 
discusses those limitations. 
Before employees may bring a Title VII claim, there are a series 
of procedural requirements that they must satisfy. First, an employee 
must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, at which point 
the EEOC will investigate to see whether there is probable cause to 
believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred.91 If the 
EEOC determines that there is probable cause, it will meet with the 
employer and the employee to attempt to resolve the conflict through 
informal methods.92 If conciliation is unsuccessful, the EEOC has 
three options: it may itself initiate a civil action against a private 
employer, it may authorize the aggrieved party to file a claim against 
the employer by issuing a notice of the right-to-sue, or, if the 
employer is a state or local government entity, the EEOC may refer 
the matter to the DOJ with a recommendation that the Attorney 
General file suit against the government entity.93 These procedural 
hurdles protect employers from being forced to defend employment 
 
 90. Brierton, supra note 14, at 192. 
 91. For details on the EEOC’s investigative authority and procedure, see generally 29 
C.F.R. §§ 1601.15–1601.17 (2012). 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006). 
 93. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In cases in which the EEOC or the Attorney General files charges 
against the employer, the aggrieved employee is not precluded from joining the suit. Id. If the 
EEOC or the Attorney General files a complaint against an employer, the aggrieved party may 
not initiate a separate action against the employer. See EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 
177 F.3d 448, 466 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hile Title VII affords recovery through private action or 
an action by the EEOC, it does not allow both . . . .”). 
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actions that occurred long ago,94 but they also risk silencing legitimate 
claims.95 Once employees satisfy the procedural prerequisites, 
employees must still prevail on the merits of their claim. 
The prima facie case for a Title VII accommodation claim 
consists of three elements: (1) the employee had a bona fide religious 
belief that conflicted with an employment duty, (2) the employee 
provided notice to the employer of the conflict, and (3) the employee 
was disciplined for failing to comply with the employment duty.96 
Because the second and third elements are relatively 
unobjectionable,97 this Note focuses only on the conflict between an 
employee’s religious belief and employment duties. Once the plaintiff 
establishes the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to 
show that it made good faith efforts to reasonably accommodate the 
employee’s religious belief98 or that any accommodation would have 
imposed an undue hardship on the employer.99 After Hardison and 
subsequent decisions, employers can provide poor accommodation—
or even deny accommodation outright—without being held liable for 
violating Title VII. 
1. The Plaintiff’s Burden and Reasonable Accommodation.  
Courts are understandably uncomfortable with the prospect of 
questioning whether an employee’s belief is in fact religiously 
based,100 and thus “the claim of [an individual] that his belief is an 
 
 94. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256–57 (1980). 
 95. See 156 CONG. REC. S10,517 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. John Kerry) 
(“There is no way to tell how many people simply quit their job rather than complain.”). 
 96. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985), aff’d, 479 U.S. 60 
(1986); accord Turpen v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984); Brown v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 1979). 
 97. The second element is reasonable because an employer needs notice of a potential 
conflict in order to make accommodations. The third element ensures that the plaintiff has 
standing to bring the case in the first place. Of course, the injury requirement could also lead to 
an underreporting of discrimination, because employees may sit in silence and comply with the 
employment duty that is contrary to their religious belief rather than risk losing both their job 
and a subsequent lawsuit. 
 98. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986) (“[A]n employer has met 
its obligation under § 701(j) when it demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable 
accommodation to the employee.”). 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006). 
 100. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (“Repeatedly and in many different 
contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular 
belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”). 
MOONEY IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2013  4:41 PM 
2013]  REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND THE HAJJ 1045 
essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight.”101 That 
is not to say, however, that courts will never look to ensure that the 
employee holds a bona fide religious belief, as the Ninth Circuit 
demonstrated in Tiano v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc.102 In that 
case, a Roman Catholic employee requested unpaid leave after she 
learned of a pilgrimage opportunity to the former Yugoslavia to 
witness visions of the Virgin Mary.103 When her employer denied the 
request, the employee went on the pilgrimage anyway and filed a 
Title VII claim after she was discharged.104 During the trial, Tiano 
testified, “I felt I was called to go [on the pilgrimage]. . . . I felt that 
from deep in my heart that I was called. I had to be there at that 
time.”105 The Ninth Circuit found this “lone unilateral statement” to 
be insufficient evidence of a “temporal mandate” to her religious 
belief.106 Because Tiano failed to present corroborating evidence, the 
court found that the timing of the pilgrimage was a matter of personal 
preference and ruled that Tiano failed to establish a prima facie case 
of religious discrimination.107 Specifically, the court held that “where 
an employee maintains that her religious beliefs require her to attend 
a particular pilgrimage, she must prove that the temporal mandate 
was part of the bona fide religious belief.”108 Otherwise, the court 
 
 101. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965). That is not to say that the inquiry 
concludes when plaintiffs claim that they hold a religious belief. Rather than focusing on 
whether the belief is truly a religious belief, the courts have instead focused on whether the 
claimed religious belief is sincerely held. See id. at 185 (“[T]he threshold question of 
sincerity . . . must be resolved in every case.”). Though Seeger dealt with exemption from the 
military draft, id. at 164–65, its logic has been applied in Title VII cases, see, e.g., Redmond v. 
GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n.12 (7th Cir. 1978) (“We believe the proper test to be applied to 
the determination of what is ‘religious’ under § 2000e(j) can be derived from the Supreme Court 
decisions in Welsh v. United States, [398 U.S. 333 (1970)], and United States v. Seeger . . . .” 
(citation omitted)). 
 102. Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 103. Id. at 680. 
 104. Id. at 680–81. 
 105. Id. at 680 (emphasis added) (quoting Mary Tiano) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 106. Id. at 682 (“For example, she did not testify that the visions of the Virgin Mary were 
expected to be more intense during that period. Nor did she suggest that the Catholic Church 
advocated her attendance at that particular pilgrimage.”). 
 107. Id. at 683. 
 108. Id. at 682. Recall, however, that courts are fairly deferential to a party’s 
characterization of a particular belief as religious. See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying 
text. Thus, Tiano may be appropriately characterized as a case of inadequate proof. Had Tiano 
presented proof of a sincerely held religious belief, the Ninth Circuit presumably would not 
have granted summary judgment. 
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reasoned, employers might be “forced to accommodate the personal 
preferences of the employee.”109 
Other courts outside of the Ninth Circuit have cited Tiano with 
approval,110 with one court explaining that “[an] employee’s desire to 
make [a] pilgrimage, which could be made at any time, at a time of 
her own choosing is a matter of personal preference” and thus is not 
entitled to Title VII protection.111 Although Title VII “leaves little 
room for a party to challenge the religious nature of an employee’s 
professed beliefs,”112 these cases demonstrate that employers are not 
precluded from doing so and that such tactics can be successful. 
In addition to requiring a bona fide religious belief, an 
employee’s belief must actually conflict with an employment duty.113 
Thus, when an employer presents a reasonable accommodation that 
eliminates the conflict, the Title VII inquiry is at an end.114 As the 
Supreme Court articulated in Ansonia Board of Education v. 
Philbrook,115 “By its very terms [Title VII] directs that any reasonable 
accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its 
accommodation obligation.”116 Employers are not required to accept 
an employee’s preferred accommodation, nor are they required to 
show that the alternatives proposed by an employee would impose 
more of an undue hardship than the employer’s chosen method of 
accommodation.117 The accommodation need only be reasonable. 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. E.g., Dachman v. Shalala, 9 F. App’x 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2001); Jiglov v. Hotel Peabody, 
G.P., 719 F. Supp. 2d 918, 929 (W.D. Tenn. 2010); Loftus v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 
No. 08-13397, 2010 WL 1139338 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2010); Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 
F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). But see Cal. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n v. Gemini 
Aluminum Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 911 (Ct. App. 2004) (“We have found no other 
published opinion relating to religious discrimination in which the expression, ‘temporal 
mandate,’ appears.”). 
 111. Jiglov, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 929. 
 112. EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de 
Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 113. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985), aff’d, 479 U.S. 60 
(1986). 
 114. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986). For an accommodation to be 
reasonable, however, it must actually “eliminate[] the conflict between employment 
requirements and religious practices.” Id. at 70. Lower courts “generally refuse” to find an 
accommodation reasonable if that accommodation could not possibly eliminate the conflict. 
Kaminer, supra note 14, at 605. 
 115. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986). 
 116. Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. at 69; see also Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(“Although the statutory burden to accommodate rests with the employer, the employee has a 
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Lower courts are generally in agreement that voluntary shift 
swaps within a neutral rotating shift system are a reasonable method 
of accommodating a religious employee,118 even if there are no 
employees who are willing to swap shifts.119 The Tenth Circuit 
succinctly articulated a rationale for this stance, stating: 
[A]n employer [has] done all that was reasonably required under 
[Title VII] once it [has] encouraged the employee to try to find 
another employee to swap shifts with him so that he could avoid 
working . . . in violation of his religious beliefs. . . . [I]t would [be] 
unreasonable to require the employer to go further and attempt to 
arrange a schedule swap for the plaintiff. We recognize[] the 
interactive and reciprocal duties inherent in a reasonableness 
analysis, and conclude[] that the employer had done all that was 
reasonably required of it when it was amenable to, and receptive to, 
efforts that the employee could have conducted for himself to 
arrange his own schedule swap.120  
Furthermore, a proposed accommodation is not unreasonable 
simply because it requires an employee to bear some economic cost.121 
In Philbrook, for instance, the Supreme Court held that unpaid leave 
is a reasonable accommodation because “[t]he direct effect of [unpaid 
leave] is merely a loss of income for the period the employee is not at 
work.”122 Similarly, an employer can propose that employees use their 
vacation days for religious observance,123 though some courts have 
 
correlative duty to make a good faith attempt to satisfy his needs through means offered by the 
employer.”). 
 118. See, e.g., Beadle v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589, 593 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(“Numerous courts have relied on Hardison in holding that similar authorizations of voluntary 
swaps instituted by employers within neutral rotating shift systems constitute reasonable 
accommodations under Title VII.”). 
 119. Kaminer, supra note 14, at 605. 
 120. Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1157 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 121. See Kaminer, supra note 14, at 606 (“The courts agree that a reasonable 
accommodation can require an employee to bear some economic cost.”). 
 122. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70–71 (alteration in original) (quoting Nashville Gas Co. v. 
Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 145 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Marshall argued that 
the majority’s distinction was a false one because unpaid leave is a “forced reduction in 
compensation based on an employee’s religious beliefs.” Id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 123. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1379 (6th Cir. 1994) (“We recognize 
that use of vacation time legitimately may be required to allow an employee to avoid work on 
religious holidays or, in combination with other methods, to allow an employee to regularly 
avoid working on the Sabbath.”); Getz v. Pennsylvania, 802 F.2d 72, 74 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding 
that Title VII does not require that an employee be able to “have her religious holidays and 
keep her vacation days as well”). 
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held that requiring an employee to use all of their vacation days is 
unreasonable.124 Employers can also satisfy their obligation by 
offering to transfer the employee to another position, so long as the 
new position preserves the employee’s employment status.125 If the 
trier of fact finds that the new position fails to sufficiently preserve 
the “compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment,” 
then an employee’s Title VII claim may proceed.126 The fact that the 
new position is less desirable is not dispositive,127 at least in part 
because “[i]t is difficult for any organization to accommodate 
employees who are choosy about assignments.”128 
2. The Employer’s Burden and Undue Hardship.  As noted in 
Section B.1, a court will inquire into whether an accommodation 
results in undue hardship for an employer only after the court finds 
that the employer failed to reasonably accommodate an employee’s 
religious beliefs or practices.129 Even then, however, the religious 
employee has an uphill battle because lower courts have interpreted 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hardison to require “a minimal level 
of accommodation.”130 Indeed, shortly after Hardison was decided, 
the Ninth Circuit recognized that “a standard less difficult to satisfy 
than the [de minimis] standard for demonstrating undue hardship 
expressed in Hardison is difficult to imagine.”131 
 
 124. See, e.g., Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1379 (“[The employee] was faced with the choice of 
working on the Sabbath or potentially using all of her accrued vacation to avoid doing 
so. . . . Such an employee stands to lose a benefit, vacation time, enjoyed by all other employees 
who do not share the same religious conflict, and is thus discriminated against with respect to a 
privilege of employment.”). 
 125. See, e.g., Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that an employer 
reasonably accommodated an employee by inviting the employee to bid for another “essentially 
equivalent” position with requirements that did not interfere with the employee’s religious 
belief); Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 776–77 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (“[T]he inquiry under Title VII reduces to whether the accommodation reasonably 
preserves the affected employee’s employment status.”). 
 126. Kelly v. Cnty. of Orange, 101 F. App’x 206, 207 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 127. See Ayele v. Allright Bos. Parking, Inc., No. 99-1044, 1999 WL 1319012, at *1 (1st Cir. 
Oct. 13, 1999) (“To be reasonable the accommodation, as the district court explained, need not 
measure up to plaintiff’s preferences, but it must be sufficiently comparable to the original 
position to amount to a reasonable alternative.”); Wright, 2 F.3d at 217 (“A much more 
searching inquiry might also be necessary if Wright, in order to accommodate his religious 
practices, had to accept a reduction in pay or some other loss of benefits.”). 
 128. Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 129. See supra notes 114–117 and accompanying text. 
 130. Kaminer, supra note 14, at 610. 
 131. Yott v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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Post-Hardison, lower courts have consistently affirmed that the 
inquiry into whether a proposed accommodation imposes an undue 
burden is fact-driven and case-specific.132 Furthermore, an employer 
must demonstrate actual hardship, not merely hypothetical or 
speculative hardship.133 If courts were to consider anticipated hardship 
or the hardship that would be incurred if multiple employees 
requested the same accommodation, any proposed accommodation 
could be calculated to reach the level of undue hardship,134 which 
“would essentially render section 701(j) meaningless.”135 Employers 
are not required, however, to actually implement an accommodation 
to prove undue hardship.136 
As Hardison demonstrates, employers are not required to bear 
significant economic or efficiency costs in order to accommodate a 
religious employee.137 Many plaintiffs continue to lose Title VII cases 
because the court finds that accommodating the religious observance 
would either impose more than a de minimis economic cost138 or 
decrease productivity.139 Courts also agree that an employer is not 
 
 132. See, e.g., Brown v. Polk Cnty., Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he precise 
reach of the employer’s obligation to its employee is unclear . . . and must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.” (quoting Beadle v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589, 592 
(11th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 133. See Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n employer’s costs of 
accommodation ‘must mean present undue hardship, as distinguished from anticipated or 
multiplied hardship.’” (quoting Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 1979))); 
Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1492 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Any proffered hardship, 
however, must be actual . . . .”). 
 134. Brown, 601 F.2d at 961. 
 135. Kaminer, supra note 14, at 611. 
 136. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76–81 (1977) (finding that the 
proposed accommodations would impose undue hardship despite the fact that none of the 
accommodations were implemented); Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 285 F.3d 508, 519 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (“[A]n employer does not have to actually experience the hardship in order for the 
hardship to be recognized as too great to be reasonable.”). 
 137. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84. Whether or not the financial cost at stake in Hardison was 
significant is a matter of debate; it would have cost TWA $150 for three months to 
accommodate Hardison. Id. at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 138. See, e.g., Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019, 1023–24 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that an employee’s proposal that his employer hire an additional driver to cover the employee’s 
shifts “would result in a significant additional cost” and would “impose more than a de minimis 
cost”); Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1380 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he hiring of an 
additional worker . . . would have entailed more than a de minimis cost, relieving [the employer] 
of the obligation to accommodate.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Brown v. Polk Cnty., Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[A]llowing [an 
employee] to direct [another] employee to type his Bible study notes would amount to an undue 
hardship on the conduct of county business, since the work that that employee would otherwise 
be doing would have to be postponed, done by another employee, or not done at all.”); Mann v. 
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required to provide accommodation if doing so would violate a valid 
law or regulation,140 result in health or safety hazards,141 violate 
seniority provisions and collective-bargaining agreements,142 or 
adversely impact coworkers.143 
In sum, courts tend to interpret section 701(j) of Title VII 
narrowly, imposing “a minimally low burden upon the employer [and] 
making most accommodations of religious employees 
unreasonable.”144 Employees are thus pressured to accept any offered 
accommodation—even when it does not adequately accommodate 
their religious observance—because courts are unwilling to require 
more of an employer.145 In some situations employers may 
accommodate their employees’ religious commitments of their own 
accord, but it is important to recognize that employers “are under 
only a very slight legal obligation to do so.”146 
III.  TITLE VII AND THE HAJJ 
As demonstrated in Part II, current Title VII jurisprudence 
provides employers with a number of methods to avoid 
accommodating an employee’s religious obligations. Due to some of 
the unique features of the hajj, however, Muslim employees will likely 
 
Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[The employee’s] proposed accommodation that the 
Postal Service ‘just do without’ her would have caused the Postal Service to suffer a significant 
loss in efficiency.”). 
 140. See, e.g., Cassano v. Carb, 436 F.3d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that an employer did 
not discriminate against an employee when it fired her for failing to provide her social security 
number because accommodating her belief would cause the employer to violate federal law). 
 141. See, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding 
that an employer did not violate Title VII when accommodating the employee’s religious belief 
would have violated California health and safety standards). 
 142. See, e.g., Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79 (majority opinion) (“[W]e do not believe that the 
duty to accommodate requires TWA to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid 
[collective-bargaining] agreement.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Harrell v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f accommodating an 
employee’s religious beliefs also causes a ‘real’ and ‘actual’ imposition on co-workers, Title VII 
does not require an employer to make such an accommodation.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Brown, 61 F.3d at 655)); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(“[The plaintiff’s] characterization of complaints by others as mere grumbling underestimates 
the actual imposition on other employees in depriving them of their shift preference at least 
partly because they do not adhere to the same religion as [the plaintiff].”). 
 144. Brierton, supra note 14, at 174. 
 145. See Engle, supra note 14, at 397 (“[P]laintiffs have generally only succeeded in their 
claims (if only by having summary judgments or dismissals reversed) when . . . courts have 
determined that the employer made no attempt at accommodation.”). 
 146. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 14, at 7. 
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find that Title VII is even less accommodating of this practice than it 
is for religious observance generally. First, employers may not even 
be obligated to accommodate the hajj, as the hajj lacks a temporal 
mandate. Second, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which 
accommodating the hajj would not impose more than a de minimis 
cost on an employer. Thus, Muslims will find little refuge in federal 
employment-discrimination law. 
Muslims are obligated to complete the hajj once in their life,147 
but the Qur’an does not dictate when a Muslim must do so, only that 
it must be performed during Dhu al-Hijjah.148 So long as Muslims 
complete the hajj at some point in their lives, they have satisfied their 
religious obligation.149 Therefore, a Muslim employee might fail to 
establish a prima facie case because there is no temporal mandate to 
the hajj; hence, there would be no conflict between employment duty 
and religious obligation.150 An employer could argue that the decision 
to go on the hajj in any particular year is a matter of personal choice 
and not of religious belief, and there is a strong possibility that the 
argument would prevail.151 
In the Berkeley case, it appears that the school district would 
have made this very argument had the case not settled.152 If the school 
district had prevailed at trial, Safoora Khan would have been forced 
to wait nearly a decade for the hajj to occur at a time that would not 
conflict with the school year. And it is important to recognize that 
Khan’s case is somewhat unique: most employees do not have three 
months off from work in the summer during which they can partake 
in the hajj. 
 
 147. AL FAISAL & NASR, supra note 46, at xiv. 
 148. See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text. 
 149. ESPOSITO, supra note 33, at 111. 
 150. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 151. Cf. Dachman v. Shalala, 9 F. App’x 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[A]ppellant’s own 
testimony confirmed that her decision to pick up the bread on Friday afternoon was simply her 
preference and not a religious requirement.”); Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 
682 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Title VII does not protect secular preferences.”); Loftus v. Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of Mich., No. 08-13397, 2010 WL 1139338, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2010) (holding 
that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case where the plaintiff’s “desire to travel to 
the Holy Land for six months was based on his personal preference rather than a religious 
obligation”). 
 152. See Consent Decree, supra note 12, at 2 (“The Board of Education denies that it has 
discriminated against Ms. Khan on the basis of her religious observance . . . and further 
contends that Ms. Khan’s decision to perform the Hajj in December 2008 was a personal choice 
of Ms. Khan’s, which it was not required to accommodate . . . .”). 
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If, however, a plaintiff can establish that the decision to perform 
the hajj in a specific year is a sincerely held religious belief, then that 
plaintiff should be able to establish a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination, even if the belief is idiosyncratic or not widely held.153 
Assuming that the Muslim plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the 
employer still has a number of chances to avoid providing 
accommodation. The only way to accommodate the hajj is to grant 
time off during Dhu al-Hijjah, which leaves the employer and 
employee constrained in finding a mutually agreeable solution. It is 
quite likely that Muslim employees will have to use most, if not all, of 
their accumulated vacation days to complete the hajj, and even that 
may not be enough time off. An employer is permitted to offer 
unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation under most 
circumstances,154 but the employer would still have to hire a 
temporary employee, reschedule current employees and pay overtime 
wages, or simply accept lost efficiency from not having that employee 
work. But all of these options impose costs that would almost 
certainly surpass the de minimis threshold.155 In addition, a risk of 
lower morale among employees can be sufficient to constitute undue 
hardship.156 
There is some authority that illustrates the difficulty of prevailing 
in a Title VII pilgrimage-accommodation lawsuit. In similar 
pilgrimage-accommodation cases, many religious employees lost their 
Title VII claims because the court in each case determined that 
accommodating the pilgrimage would impose an undue hardship on 
 
 153. See EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados 
de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate both that the 
belief or practice is religious and that it is sincerely held.”); supra notes 100–101 and 
accompanying text. If pressed, Muslim employees should be able to make the argument that 
they have a sincerely held, personal, and religious belief that they must partake in the hajj 
during the current year. Otherwise the Tiano line of reasoning would defeat every claim a 
Muslim could bring under section 701(j). See supra notes 102–112 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer’s Duty To Accommodate Employee 
Religious Practices Under Title VII After Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 50 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 513, 547 (1989) (“Because of the per se nature of [the de minimis cost] approach, cost 
alternatives are generally no longer available to employees seeking accommodation under Title 
VII.”); supra notes 137–143 and accompanying text. 
 156. See EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 317 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n 
employer is not required to adversely impact or infringe on the rights of other employees when 
accommodating religious observances.”); Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 
(5th Cir. 2000) (“The mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers . . . is sufficient to 
constitute an undue hardship.”). 
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the employer.157 In the few cases in which the plaintiff prevailed, the 
court’s decision generally turned on the employer’s failure to make 
any attempt to accommodate the religious employee.158 Indeed, these 
cases confirm what is already apparent from other religious-
accommodation cases: so long as employers demonstrate that they 
attempted to accommodate their employees and that any further 
proposed accommodation would impose more than a de minimis cost, 
the employer will likely prevail.159 Muslims will find that they face a 
nearly insurmountable task when seeking Title VII accommodation 
to complete the hajj. Instead, they will have to rely on an employer’s 
goodwill and willingness to provide extended leave to travel to Mecca 
or they will be forced to forgo the hajj. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE BERKELEY CASE AND THE POTENTIAL 
FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION 
Title VII, as applied, is not particularly accommodating of 
religious belief generally, and section 701(j) is of little benefit for 
Muslim employees who wish to complete the hajj. Yet calls for 
legislative amendment to or Supreme Court action on section 701(j) 
have been unavailing.160 Thus, if reasonable accommodation under 
 
 157. See, e.g., Firestone Fibers, 515 F.3d at 319 (“Firestone’s inability to completely 
accommodate Wise was not the result of a lack of desire, nor was it based on any intent to 
discriminate against his religion. Rather, the failure to achieve a total accommodation rests on 
the simple fact that Wise’s request for such an extraordinary number of hours exceeded what 
could be reasonably accommodated . . . .”); Favero v. Huntsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 939 F. Supp. 
1281, 1294 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (“The undisputed facts as to the regular, substitute, and other 
drivers available and used, and the effect on Huntsville [Independent School District’s] 
operations . . . establish a more than de minimis loss of efficiency.”), aff’d, 110 F.3d 793 (5th Cir. 
1997); Smith v. United Ref. Co., No. 77-71, 1980 WL 98, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1980) (holding 
that an employer was not obligated to accommodate an employee’s request for accommodation 
to perform a pilgrimage when “there were no adequate substitutes, either inside or outside [the 
employer’s] workforce, who could perform [the employee’s] duties”). 
 158. See, e.g., EEOC v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 914 F.2d 71, 72 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) 
(reversing a summary-judgment order when the employer made no showing that 
accommodating the employee would impose an undue hardship); United States v. Bd. of Trs., 
No. 92 733 WLB, 1995 WL 311336, at *13 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 1995) (“[T]he University cannot 
deny a request [for accommodation to perform a pilgrimage] based solely on the duration of the 
leave requested without analyzing its operational needs and the individual employer/employee 
relationship.”). 
 159. See Engle, supra note 14, at 388 (“[A]bout the only time that plaintiffs consistently win 
is when courts find that employers have made no effort to accommodate the employees. 
Otherwise, almost any effort seems sufficient.”). 
 160. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
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section 701(j) is to be more than simply an empty promise, a new 
means must be found for achieving those ends. 
To kick-start the development of a more accommodating and 
balanced Title VII doctrine for religious employees of all faiths, the 
EEOC and the DOJ should increasingly intervene in private hajj-
accommodation cases such as the Berkeley case. As is the case in 
other areas of the law in which the executive branch shapes the policy 
embodied in a statute,161 the EEOC and DOJ are tasked by statute to 
intervene in civil lawsuits when doing so is “of general public 
importance.”162 Here, even if future cases settle, increased 
government involvement in hajj-accommodation cases will further the 
dual purposes of the government’s enforcement authority under Title 
VII “to implement the public interest as well as to bring about more 
effective enforcement of private rights.”163 This Part outlines the 
benefits of the proposal in Sections A and B. Section C responds to 
some of the most pressing and significant objections to such a 
proposal. 
A. Increased Government Intervention in Hajj-Accommodation 
Cases Will More Effectively Vindicate Private Employees’ 
Requests for Reasonable Accommodation 
The EEOC and the DOJ’s involvement in hajj-accommodation 
cases will increase individual plaintiffs’ likelihood of prevailing in a 
Title VII claim and protect their right to reasonable accommodation. 
Employers know that, with the government’s weight behind hajj-
accommodation cases, they are more likely to face the prospect of a 
 
 161. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is one example of an executive 
agency that often shapes substantive policy through enforcement. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. 
Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON 
REG. 149, 157 (1990) (“Throughout most of its history, the SEC has consistently relied on this 
ad hoc enforcement approach to the development of certain regulatory standards.”). President 
Obama’s decision to provide temporary relief from prosecution proceedings to immigrants who 
entered the country illegally is but another example of the executive branch shaping policy 
through enforcement discretion. See generally President Barack Obama, Remarks by the 
President on Immigration at the Rose Garden (June 15, 2012), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration. Moreover, 
congressional inaction in the face of Hardison is not necessarily indicative of acquiescence to the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 701(j). See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 
750 (2006) (plurality opinion) (“Congress takes no governmental action except by 
legislation. . . . ‘Congress’ deliberate acquiescence’ should more appropriately be called 
Congress’s failure to express any opinion.” (quoting id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
 162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006). 
 163. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980). 
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long and drawn-out litigation than they would if the individual 
employee were to bring a suit.164 And as the cost of litigation 
increases, so too does the incentive to settle.165 Even if the employer 
would ultimately prevail on the merits at trial, settling is still a more 
attractive alternative if doing so would be less expensive than 
litigating the case.166 This is what seems to have happened in the 
Berkeley case. Although the school district maintained that it had not 
discriminated against Khan, it nonetheless settled because of the high 
cost of resolving the case through litigation and trial.167 
Beyond exerting economic pressure on an employer to settle, the 
government is a more informed plaintiff than are individual 
employees. As a repeat player, the government can amass useful 
information from prior settlements that one-shot plaintiffs cannot 
obtain.168 This information can be presented to the opposing party and 
to the judge as a trend in settlements or to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of an employee’s request for accommodation to 
complete the hajj.169 Because settlement operates as an “informal 
system of precedent,”170 the government can employ past settlement 
outcomes as bargaining chips in future settlement conferences.171 
 
 164. See GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 53 (4th ed. 
2006) (“The government’s endurance and resources for litigation are so great as to make its full 
scale conduct of litigation particularly burdensome for even rich and patient private litigants.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 165. See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit 
Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 225 (1999) (“[T]he reason 
cases settle is because the alternative to settlement is litigation, which is generally quite costly.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 166. See generally George L. Priest, Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An 
Economic Analysis, 1 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 163, 165 (1982) (outlining an economic model for 
litigants’ decisions to settle or to go to trial). 
 167. Consent Decree, supra note 12, at 2–3. In the hajj-accommodation case brought by the 
EEOC during the Bush administration, the employer also denied any wrongdoing but settled 
the case in order to avoid additional expense. Consent Decree, supra note 10, at 2. 
 168. Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information About 
Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 699 (2002). 
 169. See Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil 
Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 960 (2010) (arguing that prior settlements can exert “peer 
pressure” on similar litigation and can frame the normative outlook of a particular claim). In a 
survey conducted for the essay, Professor Depoorter finds that 96 percent of litigators agree that 
a lawyer must be aware of developments in settlement awards in their area of practice. Id. at 
971. 
 170. Fromm, supra note 168, at 705. 
 171. According to Professor Depoorter’s survey, 65 percent of lawyers agreed that it is 
useful to refer to favorable settlements from similar cases when in front of a judge during a 
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Although general information regarding the Berkeley case is 
available through traditional media sources172 and professional 
networks,173 the details these sources provide are incomplete. Often, 
secondary sources do not provide a complete picture of the 
settlement landscape of employment-discrimination cases, focusing 
instead on cases that may be outliers or that involve large rewards or 
novel remedies.174 As a result of this selective reporting, “[t]he scope, 
quality, and utility of information” available to private plaintiffs 
about individual lawsuits “will vary on a case-by-case basis.”175 Only 
those with firsthand knowledge of a case will understand how the 
specific facts, legal issues, and other circumstances of that case 
unfolded.176 The Berkeley case was part of a larger effort between the 
DOJ and the EEOC to coordinate enforcement of Title VII,177 and 
this coordination will allow the federal government to present a 
united front in future cases. The religious-accommodation doctrine 
requires a fact-intensive inquiry,178 and although a private plaintiff’s 
general knowledge of settlement trends from hajj-accommodation 
cases might be somewhat persuasive during a settlement conference, 
the persuasive effect is likely to be greater when the government can 
discuss the factual similarities between the cases in detail. Without a 
credible threat of a successful lawsuit—the situation in which Muslim 
employees wishing to complete the hajj will find themselves—
employers have little incentive to engage in negotiations to find a 
reasonable accommodation. The government’s intervention has the 
potential to realign the scales toward a more equal bargaining 
position. That is, employees would have the government on their side; 
employers would have the unaccommodating Title VII 
accommodation doctrine on theirs. 
Finally, government intervention in hajj-accommodation cases 
can serve an educational function, which has the potential to lead to 
 
settlement conference, and 90 percent said it was helpful to do so during settlement negotiations 
with opposing counsel. Depoorter, supra note 169, at 976. 
 172. E.g., Brachear, supra note 3; Markon, supra note 1. 
 173. E.g., Andrew Lu, Teacher’s Hajj Lawsuit Against Berkeley School District Settles, THE 
CHI. EMP’T LAW BLOG (Oct. 17, 2011, 3:09 PM), http://chicagoemploymentattorneysblog.com/
2011/10/teacher-hajj-lawsuit-against-berkeley-school-district-settles.html. 
 174. Depoorter, supra note 169, at 973. 
 175. Fromm, supra note 168, at 697. 
 176. Id. at 699. 
 177. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 5. 
 178. See supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text. 
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increased accommodation of Muslims’ beliefs and observances in the 
future without the need to resort to litigation. Islam remains largely 
misunderstood by the public,179 and many people do not appreciate 
the profound significance of the hajj.180 For example, while discussing 
the Berkeley case during a hearing entitled Protecting the Civil 
Rights of American Muslims, Senator Lindsey Graham argued: 
If you were a Christian that says I want to go to Rome for three 
weeks or I want to go to Jerusalem for three weeks in the middle of 
the school year, I would say no. You know, I’m a Christian. I don’t 
believe there’s anything in my faith that says that I get three weeks 
off to observe Easter on any particular year.181 
The Senator’s comments demonstrate two broad 
misunderstandings about the hajj. First, the Senator’s analogy 
insinuates that the pilgrimage to Mecca is simply a trip or vacation to 
a holy site rather that a religious obligation prescribed by the Qur’an. 
Second, the comment demonstrates that—possibly because there is 
no parallel obligation in Christianity—many Americans do not realize 
how important the hajj is for Muslims. Together, these observations 
suggest that, without more information, some employers may not see 
the need to accommodate their employees. 
These cases will surely be controversial,182 but media reports of 
situations like the Berkeley case may also help educate the public 
about the hajj and its importance to Muslims.183 With targeted 
government intervention, the public may begin to understand that the 
hajj is a central tenet of Islamic faith and that any inconvenience 
employers experience as a result of accommodating their employees 
 
 179. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
 180. Cf. Rattigan v. Gonzales, 503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 81 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he occasional 
cancellation or postponement of both work-related and personal travel plans, including the 
cancellation of plaintiff’s planned trip to Mecca to participate in the Hajj . . . are the type of 
employee grievances that can reasonably be expected to arise in every workplace.”). 
 181. Protecting the Civil Rights of American Muslims, supra note 9, at 16 (statement of Sen. 
Lindsey Graham). 
 182. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text. 
 183. See, e.g., Brachear, supra note 3 (describing the hajj as “one of the most important 
requirements of . . . Muslim faith”); Markon, supra note 1 (“[T]he hajj [is] one of the five pillars 
of the Islamic faith, which Muslims are obligated to do once.”). On the other hand, this strategy 
could backfire. Rather than serving an educational purpose, the government’s involvement in 
these cases could lead to a backlash similar to what the country witnessed in the wake of Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-
Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1505–11 (2006) (summarizing the political and legal backlash of Brown). 
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is only temporary. Muslim employees will make a request for time off 
to complete the hajj once in their life. An employer who understands 
these facts may be willing to make an accommodation rather than 
bear the cost of litigating a Title VII claim.184 
In sum, increased governmental involvement in hajj-
accommodation cases will effectively vindicate Muslim employees’ 
rights to reasonable accommodation in several significant ways. First, 
the weight of government resources increases the potential for costly 
and drawn-out litigation, thereby making settlement a much more 
attractive option for employers. Second, as a repeat player, the 
government has an informational advantage over one-shot plaintiffs 
and will be able to more effectively bargain with employers. Finally, 
government involvement will bring increased media exposure, which 
has the potential to educate the public about the hajj and to help 
employers see the reasonableness of the request for time off so that 
litigation can be avoided in the future. 
B. Vindicating the Broader Public Interest in Combating 
Employment Discrimination Through Hajj-Accommodation 
Cases 
Increased governmental intervention in hajj-accommodation 
cases also serves the public interest in preventing discrimination and 
providing more robust accommodation for religious employees 
generally, not just for Muslims. In this respect, government 
intervention serves as a means to a larger end. Islam is a religion that 
places a heavy emphasis on practice in addition to belief,185 and as the 
number of Muslims living in the United States grows, there will likely 
be increased pressure for Title VII to accommodate those practices. 
As Muslims find their practices accommodated, other religious 
employees will have precedent to cite to for their own requests. 
One-shot plaintiffs are unlikely to be concerned with the larger 
implications of their case on religious-accommodation 
jurisprudence;186 government intervention ensures that the public’s 
 
 184. The Berkeley case settled for $75,000, including attorney’s fees. Consent Decree, supra 
note 12, at 9–10. The hajj-accommodation case that was brought during the Bush administration 
settled for $70,000. Consent Decree, supra note 10, at 4. 
 185. ESPOSITO, supra note 33, at 86. 
 186. See Lederman, supra note 165, at 225–26 (“The parties [to a lawsuit] do not internalize 
costs or benefits to third parties. Thus, the potential precedential value of a court decision will 
factor into settlement only to the extent that the precedent would have value to one or both 
parties to the litigation itself.”). 
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interest in favorable precedent is accounted for.187 The government 
can choose cases to influence the order in which cases are brought 
before a court, potentially affecting the development of a substantive 
body of precedent.188 Although employers may prefer to fight each 
claim to establish favorable precedent, the cost of doing so will likely 
exceed the cost of settlement when the government is on the other 
side of the “v.”189 The government’s intervention, then, may keep 
cases from reaching trial. 
But settlements do not take place in a vacuum. Though many 
agree that past judicial precedent affects settlement outcomes,190 some 
commentators argue that “the supposed strict division between the 
private realm of settlement agreements and the public forum of trial 
outcomes is naive.”191 When a hajj-accommodation case settles, the 
outcome of that settlement may extend beyond the individual 
settlement agreement to affect future litigation.192 As Professor Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow explains: 
[Settlement reports] are used by practicing lawyers to guide their 
demands, settlements, and litigation decisions just as reported 
decisions do. These reports may not include . . . elaborated legal 
reasoning . . . but they provide at least as much guidance as jury 
verdicts and unreported judicial decisions. . . . [A]s cases of 
significant public importance are covered in the news, both the 
precedential and publicity effects of settlements may well exceed 
those of reported decisions, and the public . . . may be more 
 
 187. See Depoorter, supra note 169, at 982 n.98 (“[T]he collective action perspective on the 
evolution of law . . . postulates that areas of law expand more rapidly if plaintiffs are supported 
by the presence of long-term stakeholders . . . .”). 
 188. See Lederman, supra note 165, at 234 (“Precedent is . . . ‘path-dependent’: the order in 
which cases are presented to a court for decision can influence the substantive content of 
precedent.”). 
 189. See Depoorter, supra note 169, at 981 (“In the absence of effective coordination, 
defendants cannot take into account the costs that their own settlement imposes on similarly 
situated companies. . . . Future defendants would rather see a novel claim fought off, but when 
individually faced with a claim, they prefer to settle the dispute . . . .”). 
 190. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2680 (1995) (“To charge 
that settlement is ungoverned by precedent is to be grossly insensitive to the contexts in which 
settlements occur.”). 
 191. E.g., Depoorter, supra note 169, at 973. 
 192. See id. at 979 (“[T]he outcome of a settlement may reach beyond the individual 
settlement agreement and affect adjudication.”). 
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informed than if precedents were left totally to lawyer access and 
interpretation.193 
Even though settlement lacks formal binding power on future 
parties, it can still influence the development of law.194 Settlement 
outcomes will affect future settlement and litigation decisions because 
past settlement precedent can make a claim seem more reasonable 
and less novel.195 Past settlement concessions can create a pressure 
toward future concessions, and that pressure will likely be spread 
across all employers.196 
Lawyers may not be the only ones who will use settlement 
information to shape future decisions. Due to the increased 
involvement of judges in settlement proceedings, prior settlements 
can become a “benchmark or reference point” for judges when 
deciding the merits of similar cases in the future.197 Additionally, 
media coverage of lawsuits tends to affect future jury decisions and 
awards,198 and it is quite possible that media coverage of settlements 
will influence jurors’ perceptions of employment discrimination.199 
The public may begin to readjust the normative lens through which 
future religious-accommodation suits are litigated despite the fact 
 
 193. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 190, at 2681. 
 194. Depoorter, supra note 169, at 974. 
 195. Id. at 987. 
 196. Id. at 981. 
 197. Id. at 975. Judges can use their experience and personal relationships to remain 
knowledgeable of novel settlements and trends. As Professor Depoorter explains: 
Judges . . . may interpret settlement precedents as expressive statements regarding 
the appropriateness of compensation. Once a novel legal claim for tort compensation 
has been gratified by a (presumed) concession of the same sort in a private settlement 
agreement, future claims will be perceived as less extraordinary. If a company refuses 
to accept an offer that is comparable to concessions that competitors made in prior 
settlements, judges might be less sympathetic to that firm in subsequent proceedings. 
Id. at 976. 
 198. See Edith Greene, Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Jurors’ Attitudes About Civil 
Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 816–17 (1991) (finding a 
positive correlation between mock jury damage awards and the frequency of large awards in 
other cases, suggesting that jurors are influenced by media coverage and use media coverage as 
a benchmark); Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print 
Media, and Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 260 
(2004) (“Through repeated and patterned reading of [media] coverage [of employment 
discrimination complaints], individuals come to possess cultural knowledge about the law.”). 
 199. See Depoorter, supra note 169, at 978 (“[I]t is reasonable to assume that information on 
settlements will likewise influence attitudes of jurors and their perceptions of right and wrong. 
As such, information on settlements will influence the viewpoints of juries . . . .”). 
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that settlements do not formally bind future parties.200 Because of the 
feedback effect of past settlements, the legal community and the 
public will begin to view these claims as legitimate. In addition, 
because the government is able to selectively pursue Title VII claims, 
the government’s involvement could serve as a signal that a particular 
case has more merit than if the individual employee sued the 
employer.201 Thus, when an employer finally does challenge an 
employee’s hajj-accommodation case, it will be too late.202 As past 
settlements are employed in future litigation, the coverage of the 
settlements will affect the public’s perception of reasonable 
accommodation. The government’s involvement may thereby shift 
the normative view of what constitutes more than de minimis cost, 
and religious employees will be able to have their beliefs and 
practices more readily accommodated. 
Title VII should not be used simply as an ex post method of 
punishing employers for failing to accommodate their employees. 
Instead, the prospect of Title VII litigation should incentivize 
employers to cooperate with their employees to find a reasonable 
accommodation prior to the filing of charges with the EEOC. For 
instance, the two parties could agree that unpaid leave is an 
appropriate balance between a Muslim’s need to complete a 
fundamental religious obligation and an employer’s need to avoid 
 
 200. See id. at 976 (“Given their noncoercive nature, settlement agreements may be 
perceived in a normative light.”). 
 201. The EEOC and the DOJ may have an institutional interest in maintaining their 
credibility before the courts because of their status as repeat players. See Brianne J. Gorod, 
Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent Problem, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 
1245 (2012) (“Whatever obligations government lawyers may have to their client, the United 
States, they also ‘have an obligation to see that justice is done.’ This special obligation carries 
with it both responsibilities and rewards: the responsibility to temper zealous advocacy with a 
commitment to the right outcome and the concomitant reward of special respect from the 
courts.” (citation omitted) (quoting W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and 
the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333, 1349 (2009))). Moreover, a court’s awareness of 
the government’s interest in maintaining credibility could affect the way a court views the case. 
See S. REP. NO. 96-416, at 23 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 787, 805 (stating, in the 
context of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 
(1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997–1997j (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)), that the 
“Justice Department brings credibility to the proceedings,” as “[t]he mere presence of the 
Department alerts a court that conditions . . . are sufficiently serious to warrant the attention of 
the Attorney General”). 
 202. Cf. Depoorter, supra note 169, at 976–77 (“When the judge considers these standards in 
settlement conferences, bench trials, or remittitur, he or she might perceive this as enforcing an 
industry norm, instead of introducing novel changes to existing law. In this sense, settlement 
conferences are an opportunity for judges to reinforce settlement norms and standards.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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incurring extensive costs. In fact, allowing a Muslim employee to take 
unpaid leave is probably the most reasonable method of 
accommodating the competing interests of the employer and the 
employee. Under Hardison and subsequent cases, however, an 
employer can simply decline to offer any accommodation because 
even this sensible accommodation would impose more than a de 
minimis cost.203 
So long as employers know that Title VII requires so little,204 
section 701(j) cannot provide the incentive to find solutions to 
conflicts between employment duties and employees’ religious 
beliefs.205 Insofar as parties operate and bargain in the shadow of the 
law, Title VII casts a decidedly small shadow on employers. Hajj-
accommodation cases such as the Berkeley case present an entry 
point for effecting change because they can demonstrate to employers 
that the federal government believes that Title VII actually does 
require accommodation of employees’ religious practices. Beyond 
protecting private plaintiffs, the EEOC and the DOJ have an 
obligation to vindicate the public interest; they “should not sit on the 
sidelines as courts apply the law and establish precedent.”206 By 
intervening in future cases, the government can fulfill its twin roles207 
and begin to realign the scales toward reasonable accommodation. 
Once that happens, the government can reduce its involvement 
because section 701(j) will provide a stronger ex ante incentive to 
accommodate. 
If increased government involvement in Title VII creates 
favorable precedent for Muslim employees wishing to complete the 
hajj, other religious employees stand to benefit as well. Non-Muslim 
employees can use precedent from hajj-accommodation cases to show 
the reasonableness of their own religious-accommodation claims. 
Islam is a religion with many requirements and obligations, and many 
of these practices create conflicts that will impose more than a de 
 
 203. See supra Part II. 
 204. See supra note 145; see also supra Part II. 
 205. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement 
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 327 (1991) (“[L]itigants 
order their private, out-of-court negotiations around the substantive law and procedure that will 
be applied if the negotiations break down and the court steps out of the shadows to adjudicate 
the dispute.”). To the extent that employers know that they will not be held liable under the 
substantive law, there is little incentive to negotiate a suitable accommodation for employees. 
 206. Edward M. Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
211, 234 (2008). 
 207. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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minimis cost on employers, as the term is currently understood. But if 
there is precedent for accommodating these practices, then less 
burdensome accommodations proposed by other religious employees 
are more likely to be accommodated as well. Although the Supreme 
Court’s definition of “undue hardship” may remain the same, 
government intervention in Title VII litigation has the potential to 
breathe new life into section 701(j). 
C. A Response to Potential Objections 
Of course, a proposal for increased governmental involvement in 
private hajj-accommodation cases is likely to raise more than a few 
objections. This Note will respond to three here: (1) employers should 
not be forced to accommodate every religious belief and practice, (2) 
the government should not shape the course of religious-
accommodation doctrine through litigation, and (3) even if the 
government should, it should not litigate on behalf of a particular 
religion. 
1. How far is too far?  The language of Title VII is clear and 
sensible: employers are not required to accommodate an employee’s 
religious practice if doing so would impose an undue hardship.208 
There are costs that employers cannot—and should not—be expected 
to bear. But by equating undue hardship with de minimis cost, the 
Supreme Court “effectively nullif[ied]” section 701(j).209 
The law is full of difficult balancing tests, and the courts have 
shown themselves to be capable of “distinguish[ing] between real 
threat and mere shadow.”210 Although it may be difficult in certain 
situations, judges are required to engage in the “hard task of 
judging,”211 and they must fairly consider the important competing 
values at stake in religious-accommodation cases.212 Concededly, 
government intervention risks swinging the pendulum too far in the 
other direction, but there is a point at which the government could 
temper its intervention. It is not the aim of this Note to suggest that 
the government should intervene in every hajj-accommodation case—
 
 208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006). 
 209. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 89 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 210. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 211. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring). 
 212. See id. (“When two bedrock principles so conflict, understandably neither can provide 
the definitive answer. Reliance on categorical platitudes is unavailing.”). 
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or even most cases. Nor does this Note advocate for an absolute 
obligation to accommodate religious employees. Instead, this Note 
proposes a means to achieving a more robust and balanced 
accommodation doctrine, one in which courts actually balance the 
competing interests, rather than summarily dismissing the concerns of 
religious employees by rubber-stamping an employer’s decision. 
Although the slippery-slope objection is a fair one, it cuts both ways. 
Hardison and subsequent cases demonstrate what happens when the 
law strays too far in the other direction. 
The First Amendment serves as a natural backstop for this 
Note’s proposal because the government cannot impose an absolute 
obligation on employers to accommodate their employees’ religious 
practices.213 Title VII does not purport to establish a religion or to 
mandate absolute accommodation. Rather, its prohibition of 
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin has the secular purpose of ensuring employment 
opportunity to all groups in society.214 As Justice O’Connor observed, 
“Title VII calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation 
and extends that requirement to all religious beliefs and 
practices . . . an objective observer would perceive it as an anti-
discrimination law rather than an endorsement of religion or a 
particular religious practice.”215 The government’s intervention is an 
attempt to restore that spirit of reasonable accommodation such that 
section 701(j) can have some import in future accommodation cases 
and can—like the prohibition of employment discrimination based on 
race, color, sex, and national origin—provide employment 
opportunities for members of all faiths. 
Furthermore, accommodating the hajj is in some ways less 
burdensome than other accommodations that employers are required 
by law to make. For instance, an employer who accommodates a 
Sabbatarian pursuant to Title VII loses that employee for fifty-two 
 
 213. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985) (“[T]he Connecticut 
statute, which provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on 
their Sabbath, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”). One commentator 
suggests that the Court’s decision in Hardison was motivated by a “concern that a more 
burdensome accommodation requirement would violate the Establishment Clause.” Michael W. 
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 685, 704 (1992). Professor McConnell concludes, however, that “[t]his cannot be 
the constitutional test; most accommodations that have been recognized as legitimate impose 
more than a de minimis burden on others.” Id. 
 214. Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 712 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 215. Id. (emphasis added). 
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days out of the year, every year. An employee who takes advantage 
of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993216 is eligible for up to 
twelve weeks of unpaid leave each year a child is born or adopted.217 
Muslims who wish to complete the hajj, by contrast, will only need 
about three weeks of leave, once in their life. All of this is not to say 
that accommodating the hajj will not impose costs on an employer, 
but the hajj is not necessarily unique in that employees must take 
time off from work. Certainly there will be cases in which the cost of 
accommodating the hajj will be significant, and in those cases, 
accommodation may be impossible. But Hardison and subsequent 
cases dictate that almost any cost, significant or otherwise, is sufficient 
to deny accommodation. A more balanced approach is needed. 
2. It Is Not the Government’s Place To Shape the Course of Title 
VII Accommodation Through Litigation.  First, there is a pragmatic 
answer to this objection that probably begs the question: nothing else 
has worked. Though commentators deride the Court’s decision in 
Hardison,218 the fact remains that the Court has not overturned its 
holding. Similar cries for legislative amendment to Title VII have 
proved fruitless. 
It is not as if Congress is unaware of the impact that Hardison 
and subsequent cases have had on religious accommodation. At least 
one chamber of Congress has considered the Workplace Religious 
Freedom Act (WFRA)––a piece of legislation specifically aimed at 
amending section 701(j) of Title VII—in every session since 1994.219 
The 2012 incarnation of the WFRA specifically finds that the Court’s 
holding in Hardison is “contrary to the intent of Congress.”220 But the 
WFRA has never passed through a chamber of Congress. In fact, it 
 
 216. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 217. Id. § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006). 
 218. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 219. See S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 110th Cong. 
(2008); H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 677, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1445, 109th Cong. 
(2005); S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2572, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 4237, 106th Cong. (2000); 
S. 1668, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 92, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2948, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 2071, 
104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 4117, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 5233, 103d Cong. (1994). 
 220. S. 3686 § 2. The WFRA redefines undue hardship to include only those 
accommodations that “impose[] a significant difficulty or expense on the conduct of the 
employer’s business.” Id. § 4 (emphasis added). This definition of undue hardship is similar to 
the one contained in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. I, 
§ 101(10), 104 Stat. 327, 331 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2006)). 
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has never made it out of committee.221 And as Congress failed to 
restore section 701(j) to its intended purpose, the number of claims of 
religious discrimination filed with the EEOC more than doubled 
between 1992 and 2007, and “there is no way to tell how many people 
simply quit their job rather than complain.”222 If minority religions are 
to be protected, legislative amendment is not a promising route. 
A more nuanced answer must acknowledge that the discussion 
about a framing effect of settlement and its impact on future cases is 
speculative. It may very well be the case that even if the government 
settles twenty hajj-accommodation cases, a district court will throw 
out the first case to reach trial on summary judgment, and an 
appellate court will affirm the decision. That rejection would create 
unfavorable precedent, which would negatively impact future cases 
for Muslims and religious employees generally. But this point circles 
back to the first answer: nothing else has worked. Waiting for the 
Court to reexamine Hardison or for Congress to amend section 701(j) 
means that religious employees have to accept an unaccommodating 
religious-accommodation jurisprudence. If this Note’s proposed 
strategy does not work, and Title VII does not impose a duty to 
accommodate one of the Five Pillars of Islam, then section 701(j) 
truly has become a statute that “while brimming with sound and fury, 
ultimately signif[ies] nothing.”223 
3. The Government Should Not Litigate on Behalf of a Particular 
Religion.  Government intervention on behalf of a particular religion 
in the context of Title VII is not unprecedented. Indeed, the EEOC 
and the DOJ have filed numerous religious-accommodation lawsuits 
on behalf of Worldwide Church of God members.224 Just as other 
agencies of the executive branch have enforcement discretion in other 
areas of law,225 the EEOC and the DOJ have discretion in whether 
 
 221. See, e.g., S. 3686 (112th): Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2013, GOVTRACK, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3686 (last visited Jan. 16, 2013). 
 222. 156 CONG. REC. S10,517 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. John Kerry). 
 223. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 87 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 224. Eugene Volokh, “Department of Justice Enforces the Sharia: Sues Illinois School 
District for Muslim Teacher Hajj,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 14, 2010, 2:02 PM), http://
volokh.com/2010/12/14/department-of-justice-enforces-the-sharia-sues-illinois-school-district-
for-muslim-teacher-hajj (citing those cases). 
 225. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (“A principal feature of 
the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.”); Wayte v. 
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal justice system, the Government retains 
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and how to enforce Title VII.226 The government is tasked with 
ensuring effective enforcement of employees’ Title VII rights, and the 
hajj presents an opportune point of entry for government 
intervention. But the intervention is not just about obtaining 
accommodation for Muslims; it is about restoring some semblance of 
reasonableness to section 701(j). 
Although the immediate impact of this strategy benefits 
Muslims, other religious employees will benefit from these cases as 
well.227 Many of the requirements of Islam actually impose more than 
a de minimis cost on employers, but these cases may begin to shift the 
normative framework through which reasonable accommodation is 
applied. Government involvement will likely be controversial; it was 
in the Berkeley case. The long-term effect of these cases, however, 
will lead to increased accommodation for religious employees of all 
faiths. 
CONCLUSION 
The Berkeley case demonstrates the need for a shift in the way 
that the Title VII religious-accommodation doctrine is applied. The 
hajj is a central tenet of Islam, yet the Berkeley school district 
probably would have mounted a successful defense against Safoora 
Khan’s claim of religious discrimination but for the DOJ’s 
involvement. Indeed, the hajj will almost always impose more than a 
de minimis cost on employers, and in those situations Title VII will 
provide no protection for Muslim employees. Muslims wishing to 
complete the hajj will be forced to choose between their faith and 
their job, the exact choice that Senator Randolph hoped to eliminate 
when he proposed section 701(j).228 
In this regard, this Note joins the commentary on the failure of 
Title VII to fulfill its promise of reasonable accommodation for 
religious belief and practice. The standard articulated in Hardison 
and applied in subsequent cases—which equates undue hardship with 
more than a de minimis cost—is contrary to the spirit of section 
 
‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.” (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 
380 n.11 (1982))). 
 226. EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 458 (6th Cir. 1999); cf. Kennedy, 
supra note 206, at 232 (arguing that the president assuming office after George W. Bush should 
establish new enforcement priorities within the DOJ Civil Rights Division). 
 227. See supra Part IV.B. 
 228. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
MOONEY IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2013  4:41 PM 
1068 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1029 
701(j).229 Unlike previous commentary, however, this Note attempts to 
articulate a workable strategy that can begin to tip the scales so that 
the interests of employees and employers are fairly balanced. 
Hardison was decided in 1977—more than twenty-five years ago—
and the Court has not seen fit to reexamine its holding since then. 
Despite repeated attempts by members of Congress, the WFRA has 
never made it out of committee. With two branches of the 
government unwilling or unable to act, the path to more effective 
accommodation must begin from another source—the third, 
remaining branch. 
The EEOC and the DOJ have a clear mandate from Congress to 
enforce Title VII,230 and action taken on behalf of individuals also 
furthers the public interest.231 Increased intervention by the EEOC 
and the DOJ in future hajj-accommodation cases has the potential to 
be the solution to the vexing problem of providing reasonable 
accommodation––for Muslims as well as for religious employees 
generally. In the short term, these interventions benefit the individual 
plaintiffs seeking accommodation because employers are more likely 
to settle when the government is involved in the case. But these 
settlements have value outside of the immediate lawsuit. Over time, 
hajj-accommodation cases can begin to adjust the lens through which 
the courts and the public view reasonable accommodation and undue 
hardship. Courts may begin to evaluate undue hardship consistent 
with congressional intent and the plain language of section 701(j). 
Employees can use information about past settlements in future 
negotiations to demonstrate the reasonableness of their proposed 
accommodation. Title VII will finally be able to create an incentive 
for employers to cooperate with their employees in working to 
resolve conflicts between employment duties and religious practices 
prior to litigation. Religious employees will finally have a legitimate 
opportunity to benefit from the protections promised by section 
701(j), and the government will help to restore the spirit of 
reasonable accommodation. 
 
 229. See supra notes 57–68 and accompanying text. 
 230. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). 
 231. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980). 
